Although Game Theory principles have been used extensively in developing analytical models for access pricing in Internet networks, transmission pricing in electric power networks and access pricing in telephone/cable networks, most of the existing literature omits the effects of illegal filesharing. This article shows that: 1) Shapley Value analysis is generally inaccurate for most situations, and 2) Shapley Value analysis are generally not applicable to network analysis.
Introduction
File sharing and illegal downloads of content have resulted in millions of dollars of losses for many companies and substantial lawsuits by trade groups and entertainment companies. Illegal downloads affect the economics, profitability and business models of companies in many industries such as entertainment, education, travel, investments/finance, and any business where knowledge has value. In the US, the Napster case illustrates some of the policy, technological and economic issues inherent in systems for downloading content. Golle, Leyton-Brown, Mironov & Lillibridge (________); Clark & Tsiaparas (2002) . See: www.newsservice.stanford.edu/news/2004/march17/fileshare-317.html.
I. Existing Literarture
Some authors/researchers have attempted to apply the Shapley Value (and related theories) to access pricing, and to allocation of revenues/costs in networks. Ma Existing MDT does not account for varying levels of "confidentiality" of agents' informationrather, MDT erroneously assumes that a binary situation exists in which information is either publicly known or is completely private. Existing MDT does not incorporate the effects of government regulation on agents and on the mechanism; and does not account for the un-constitutionality/constitutionality of mechanisms.
MDT errorneously assumes that all agents are "rational" and self-interested; but there can be many reasons for agents' irrationality and or agents' propensity to act for the benefit of the society or for the benefit of an interest group. MDT erroenously assumes that there is always some minimum level of uniformity of agents' preferences; but on the contrary, Agents' preferences vary widely.
MDT does not account for differences in agents' information-processing capabilities. MDT erroenously assumes that each mechanism is monolithic and static in time, space and expense -in reality and on the contrary, some mechanisms are dispersed in space (various locations) and time (requires participation, revisions of knowledge and various disclosures at various times) and expenses (the costs of participation in the mechanism varies).
MDT errorneously assumes that in mechanisms, monitoring costs, compliance costs, switching costs, access costs, decision costs (the costs of contemplating a decision) and sanctions (for non-compliance with the mechanism) are minimal or non-existent. In reality, these types of costs are monetary/physical and or non-monetary/psychological and can have significant effects on the efficiency of mechanisms.
MDT errorneously assumes that agents have quasi-linear utility functions and are risk-neutral; but in reality, agents' attitudes towards risk vary dramatically and depend on many factors. Furthermore, agents' utility functions are more likely to be non-linear (and not linear) because the agent will react to the various dimensions of the mechanism (economically, psychologically and socially), and will also react to the prospect of there being other participants, and also react to perceived opportunity costs, in addition to his/her normal utility function.
MDT errorneously assumes that the social choice functions inherent in mechanism designs have linear "Benefit Effects"; where a Benefit Effect is defined as the economic gain or loss of social welfare across all agents and across the society/economy, as the mechanism functions during a specified time interval. Hence, the Benefit Effect is defined with respect to time and to the entire economy. Contrary to MDT, Benefit Effects are likely to be non-linear because agents characteristics vary in terms of wealth, utility functions, risk aversion, time horizon, preferences, etc.; and the economy is not static, and changes in various elements of the economy are not discrete; and finally, not all eligible agents or permitted agents or financially-capable agents will participate in the mechanism.
MDT errorneously assumes that the social choice functions inherent in mechanism designs have uniform and same "Impact Effects" across all agents; where an Impact Effect is the magnitude of the monetary and non-monetary impact of the mechanism on all agents. MDT erroenously assumes that all social choice functions inherent in mechanisms have linear effects on agents' utilities and participation strategies MDT errorneously assumes that all eligible, financially capable and permitted agents will participate in the mechanism, and will participate at the same time. and as an objective; and the concept of equilibrium is "static". In reality true equilibrium does not exist, and cannot be achieved in mechanisms due to: a) continous changes in agents' preferences, information processing capabilities, time constraints, wealth, access to information, etc., b) transaction costs and opportunity costs, c) mental states of agents, d) government regulations and or industry standards/practices, e) agents' varying reactions to incentives over time.
MDT errornously assumes that each agent's and all agents' preferences are static over time; and mechanisms are preference formation-independent (ie. the mechanism does not affect the agents' processes of forming their preferences). In reality, most mechanisms are interactive, and the agent's preferences change over time as he/she interacts with both the mechanism and other agent-participants and nonparticipants. In most MDTs, Mechanisms are defined and designed only in terms of agents' preferences, public actions, and private actions. This approach does not incorporate the effects of agents' reactions to incentives, and values of hidden information to agents, and agents' information processing capabilities, the mechanism's information processing capabilities, regulation and government enforcement. Contrary to MDT, the set of all possible preferences of agents is not finite. Within this context of mechanisms and group action, the definition of 'finite" should be based on achievability, and not on mathematical ranges.
MDT errornously assumes that the mechanism is removed from, and distinct from the agents -in reality, the agents typically form a major part of the mechanism (as in auctions, online file sharing networks, multiple listing systems, etc.). MDT errorneously assumes that the mechanism's main role is either allocation and or coordination. In reality many mechanisms serve other economic and non-economic purposes (some of which are un-intended) such as: a) psychological reassurance (voting, auctions, etc.), b) information dissemination, c) comparison -which increases social welfare by reducing overall agents' search costs, d) entertainment. MDT erroneously assumes that mechanisms can be deliberation-proof (in equilibrium, all agents don't have any incentive to strategically deliberate). In most existing mechanisms, agents deliberate while using the mechanism.
III. Interconnection Fees Can Be Irrelevant In Network Design.
The existing literature on network access pricing un-necessarily focuses on Interconnection Fees (Peering Fees and Transiting Fees) as the main element for the improvement of networks. The main method of analysis has been Game Theory which has been shown to have major weaknesses. Under established principles of Game Theory and Dynamical Systems analysis, the Interconnection Fee is almost irrelevant if any of the following conditions exist:
1) The Interconnection Fee is a very small component of the total average per-packet (per unit) end-to-end cost of transmitting packets in the ISP's network or in the combined coalition members' network.
2) For purposes of financial reporting, Network transmission costs (amortization, deprecation of network infrastructure, Interconnection fees and bandwidth) must be expensed in the period incurred.
3) The market is protected or regulated -eg. by government regulations. The government may also decide to fix or reduce or limit Inter-connection fees in order to promote competition. 
5)
ISPs can terminate Peering/Interconnection Agreements at-will or with minimal termination costs. 6) For any distance d in any given region r, ISPs can quickly and cheaply re-configure their physical networks (routers, switches, etc.). This condition is feasible in many wireless networks, and particularly with the new generation of wireless networks where each mobile device is a node in the network and also carries/transmits third-party traffic signals.
7)
The cost of building wireless networks is lower than the cost of land-based networks. 8) There is no required minimum "contribution" to a coalition by each ISP-member (where "contribution" is the required minimum size of the ISP's network). In such cases, an ISP with minimal or no physical network will be able to obtain a share of the coalition's revenues from the transmission of its packets.
9) Quality of Service (QoS) is a primary/dominant factor in ISP's decisions about Interconnection
Agreements.
10)
In most markets, of the two types of Interconnection Agreements ("Peering" and "Transiting" Agreements), Peering Agreements account for the super-majority (eg. more than Seventy Percent) of all Interconnection Agreements, and Peering Agreements do not result in any additional costs for the ISP (each ISP agrees to carry the other ISP's traffic for free).
Note that Interconnection fees are only one component of the ISP's costs and other cost components
include: a) the non-transmission costs -such as administration, marketing, compliance, etc..; b) physical maintainance costs; c) costs of congestion. Thus, Interconnection fees may be a non-material component of the ISP's cost structure; and in such circumstances, the ISP's propensity to join any coalition will not be driven by interconnection fees, but may be influenced by other factors such as reputation, brand equity, Antitrust laws, other ISPs' "Contributions", the subject ISP's planned growth, innovation and availability ofc cash.
The ISP incurs various types of costs in order to transmit content to customers, and these costs are: a) administrative costs, b) marketing costs, c) infrastructure maintainance costs, d) capital expenses -network infrastructure costs, e) variable transmission costs-bandwidth, professional staff, Interconnection fees, f) compliance costs, etc..
IV. The "Shapley Value" Is Inaccurate And Cannot Be Used In The Analysis of Access Pricing Or For
The Allocation of Revenues/Costs In Networks.
Within the context of Interconnection Agreements, the Shapley Value can be accurate and relevant if
and only if certain conditions exist -the following are the conditions required for Shapley Value to be valid, and why these conditions are false and don't exist.
Theorem #1: The physical structure of the Internet is never constant.
Proof: In reality, although the physical connections of ISP's networks may remain fixed in time and space, the true structure of the network (the actual transmission pathways, and hence the "Network") is not constant, and changes instantenously, depending on the locations of the sender-receiver pairs. In almost all instances, each packet has more than one feasible path. Furthermore, in land-based networks the cable used in transporting packets typically has more than one section of wires so that for each distance d in any cable, there is more than one feasible transmission pathway. Similarly, in any wireless network, for any two points in distance d, there are many possible transmission paths. ▄ Theorem #2: For any transmission, even if the Originating ISP knows the cost structure and payoff of every other ISP that is required to transport any given packet, optimal allocation of costs or revenues among cooperating ISPs is never feasible.
Proof: The Shapley Value analysis erroneously assumes that each ISP knows the cost structure and payoff patterns of every other ISP that is a member of the coalition. In reality, statutes prevent public disclosure of cost and pricing information of ISPs; and statutes also prevent ISP from sharing information among themselves. Active competition among ISPs will almost always preclude their voluntary disclosure of their ISPs is likely to create substantial dis-agreements over fairness of allocations, and or will also affect (reduce) each ISP's willingness to invest capital to build physical or wireless networks. This is because each ISP calculates its return-on-capital and marketing ROI differently. Such Disclosure-Influenced Free Riding will in turn, limit the growth of the coalition's overall network and preclude or eliminate any efficiency of the allocations of costs/revenues among the ISPs. ▄
Theorem #3: For every packet and for each time interval t, and for any distance d in the coalition's combined network, each ISP (originating ISP or transmitting ISP) cannot choose an optimal path.
Proof: An ISP cannot control the routing choices of other ISPs. In reality the selected path for each packet is determined by pre-established automated algorithms of each ISP, and these algorithms don't always adapt to changes in the network physical structure or transmission-path(s) -which was referred to above as Coordination-Control Neutrality. Furthermore, because each ISP is not able to obtain very accurate information about historical or future packet loss, its impossible for the ISP to plot a "optimal transmission path". Its highly unlikely that any ISP will permit other ISPs to control or overly influence its routing algorithms even in a cooperative network. Antitrust laws will almost surely prevent such coordination.
Routing algorithms are complex and are sensitive to changes in network characteristics and the level of human input. The only feasible way that ISPs in a cooperative network can safely influence each others routing algorithm is if they all use the same commercially-available Routing Algorithm -which is highly unlikely. The second-best alternative is to provide a system of cash incentives to convince each ISP to allow other ISPs to influence their Routing Algorithms. The properties of any such incentive (I) are as follows: a) Consistency and Time Invariance: the ISP cannot deviate from the incentive mechanism Q. b) Scope limitation -Q is limited only to participating ISPs. This presents a huge problem because coalition members cannot control the growth of non-member ISPs. In some markets, Coalition members must connect with non-members of the coalition, in order to complete transmissions.
where O i is the value of the ISP's opportunity costs of complying with the incentive mechanism in every transmission. Q i is the value of the incentive mechanism for the ISP for transmission i. d) Additivity: for any transmission over d i .
Because any given ISP cannot "choose" an optimal path in the Network, Shapley Value analysis is not applicable. ▄
Theorem #4: For Any Transmission Over Any Distance (d), The ISP's Share of Revenues (or Share of Transmission Costs) Generated By The Coalition Is Not Always Non-Negative (Can Be Negative).
Proof: The Shapley Value function errorneously assumes that the ISP's share of revenues generated by the coalition is always non-negative, and that the ISP's share of costs generated by the coalition transmission is always non-negative. On the contrary, there are some instances where the ISP's share of total transmission revenues generated by the coalition is negative (less than zero) or should be negative, and these include the following: a) When the ISP's transmission results in excessive packet loss such that the entire information-unit has to be re-transmitted. b) Where the ISP earns non-coalition third-party benefits for carrying the packet, but is effectively subsidized indirectly by coalition members. c) Where given specific transmission algorithms (and congestion control algorithms) that are implemented by coalition member ISPs, ISP-A's transmission of a packet increases the probability that certain other types of packets will be sent by both coalition member and non-members to, and transmitted through ISP-A's network.
d) Where transmitting a certain packet through the ISP's network exponentially increases each subsequent coalition member's costs of carrying the same packet to its destination. e) Where transmission by an ISP results in addition of data to the packet which then increases the required minimum bandwidth and costs for further transmission by all other coalition members. ▄
Theorem #5: For any time interval t, and for any distance d in the Coalition's networks, the marginal contribution of each coalition-member ISP is not Always Directly Proportional to: 1) Distance, or 2)
Bandwidth Consumed.
Proof: The Shapley Function erroenously implies that for any time interval t, and for any distance d in the
Coalition's networks, the marginal contribution of each coalition-member ISP is directly proportional to: 1) distance, and 2) bandwidth consumed. This is not always true. For example, with regard to distance, the marginal contribution of a coalition-member ISP that transports a packet for 100 meters in an extremely high density city-block with significant internet congestion, is greater than the marginal contribution of an ISP that transports a similar packet for 1,000 meters in a low-density rural area with no internet congestion. ▄
Theorem #6: For any time interval t and for any distance d in the Coalition's networks, the number of coalition members is not always non-negative.
Proof: The Shapley Function erroenously implies that for any time interval t and for any distance d in the Coalition's networks, the number of coalition members is not always non-negative. An ISP can be deemed a Value allocation of cost, and will not have adequate incentives to remain in any coalition of ISPs. Also, if R a and R m are above a certain dollar threshold (X), the ISP will face an increasing risk of operating losses, financial distress and exit, and hence, the ISP will not have sufficient incentive to remain in any coalitionthe ISP will most probably shift its focus and resources to reducing its non-transmission costs, and will probably attempt to create other coalitions with third parties. In general, participation in these coalitions is not mandatory and ISPs can negotiate with various coalitions for membership or exit; subject to terms of Peering Agreements. Hence, there are three possible states which are: a) X > Y, b) Y > X, and X = Y.
However, if X > Y, and R a , R m ε (X,Y), the average coalition member will have some incentives to remain in the coalition, but such member can improve its position by negotiating with other non-member ISPs for Peering Agreements, or by expanding its own physical infrastructure or by joining third-party coalitions.
Even where membership in a coalition is mandatory for all or part of the time period, coalition member ISPs can still improve their payoffs by expanding their own physical networks.
Similarly, for any time interval t and for any distance d in the coalition's network, if the average peer-unit Interconnection Fee (P a ) or Marginal per-unit Inter-connection Fee (P m ) (for transporting a unit of bandwidth or packet) is below a certain dollar threshold (Y), the ISP may not care much about Interconnection Fees, and will not have adequate incentives to remain in any coalition of ISPs. Also, if P a and P m are above a certain dollar threshold (X), the ISP will have strong incentives to leave the coalition and expand its own physical network; or strong incentives to reduce its physical network and enter into more Peering/Interconnection Agreements with non-coalition ISPs. In general, participation in these coalitions is not mandatory and ISPs can negotiate with various coalitions for membership or exit; subject to terms of Peering Agreements. Hence, there are three possible states which are: a) X > Y, b) Y > X, and X = Y.
However, if X > Y, and P a , P m ε (X,Y), the average coalition member will have some incentives to remain in the coalition, but such member can improve its position by negotiating with other non-member ISPs or by expanding its own physical infrastructure or by reducing its physical network infrastructure or by joining third-party coalitions. Even where membership in a coalition is mandatory for all or part of the time period, coalition-member ISPs can still improve their payoffs by expanding their own physical networks. Thus, there can never be any Nash Equilibrium or Stackelberg Equilibrium for such coalitions of transporting ISPs.
Similarly, for any time interval t and for any distance d in the coalition's network, if the average peer-unit Revenue (F a ) or Marginal per-unit Revenue (F m ) (for transporting a unit of bandwidth or packet) is below a certain dollar threshold (Y f ), the ISP will not have adequate incentives to remain in any coalition of ISPs, primarily because the ISP will face financial distress and possible exit from the market. Also, if F a and F m are above a certain dollar threshold (X f ), the ISP will have: a) strong incentives to leave the coalition and expand its own physical network; or b) substantial incentives to remain in the coalition but vary the size of its network, and hence, the amount of its payoff, or c) substantial incentives to reduce the size of its physical network and enter into more Peering/Interconnection Agreements with both coalition-member ISPs and or non-coalition ISPs. In general, participation in these coalitions is not mandatory and ISPs can negotiate with various coalitions for membership or exit; subject to terms of Interconnection/Peering Agreements. Hence, Consider a sub-game in which there is a market and there are six ISPs in the market ISP 1 ……..ISP 6 .
D% of total traffic has to pass though some part of each ISP's network in order to complete the transmission.
Each ISP has its own FLCC (A n ) and so there are A 1 …………A 6 FLCCs. The degree of similarity and or goal congruence between any two pairs of FLCC algorithms is referred to as Congruency Index (CI) which increases as the two FLCC's objectives and criteria are more similar. For traffic to flow adequately, there must be at least B% of CI among FLCC's A 1 ………….A 6 . If CI is below B%, then there is substantial risk of packet delay or packet loss as B tends to 100%, the probability of successful transmission tends to one.
FLCCs are typically highly proprietary algorithms. While technology companies typically meet to set industry standards, such standards are typically for non-proprietary items or processes. This implies that there must be some minimum amount of collusion or collaboration among ISPs in order to ensure that there is the minimum CI percentage (B%) -such collusion is most probably illegal under most antitrust laws.
Conclusion
The 
